Recent Decisions: Securities Exchange Act of 1934 - Section 16(b) - Corporation Liable as a Director [\u3ci\u3eFeder v. Martin Marietta Corp.\u3c/i\u3e, 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), \u3ci\u3epetition for cert. filed\u3c/i\u3e, 38 U.S.L.W. 3018 (U.S. May 16, 1969) (No. 125)] by Lawrence, William B.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 21 | Issue 1
1969
Recent Decisions: Securities Exchange Act of 1934
- Section 16(b) - Corporation Liable as a Director
[Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d
Cir. 1969), petition for cert. filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3018
(U.S. May 16, 1969) (No. 125)]
William B. Lawrence
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
William B. Lawrence, Recent Decisions: Securities Exchange Act of 1934 - Section 16(b) - Corporation Liable as a Director [Feder v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), petition for cert. filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3018 (U.S. May 16, 1969) (No. 125)], 21 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 113 (1969)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol21/iss1/7
1969]
Recent Decisions
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 - SECTION 16(b) -
CORPORATION LIABLE AS A DIRECTOR
Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969),
petition for cert. filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3018 (U.S. May 16,
1969) (No. 125).
The Securities Exchange Act of 19341 was -intended to establish
and maintain a free and honest market for trading in corporate se-
curities.2 In enacting such -legislation, Congress was particularly
sensitive to -the abuses inherent in insider trading. The Act there-
fore places restrictions upon corporate insiders who, by reason of
their relationship to the corporation, can abuse their position and
use information not made public to benefit their personal market
activities.' Section 16(b) of the Act4 is specifically designed to dis-
courage directors, officers, and large shareholders of the issuer
from speculating in short-term trading of the issuer's securities. It
operates to achieve this purpose by preventing any director, officer,
or 10 percent shareholder from realizing any profit on -the purchase
and sale, or the sale and purchase of -the corporation's equity securi-
ties within a period of less than 6 months. To enforce its prohibi-
tion, section 16(b) provides that any profits made by such persons
shall inure -to and be recoverable by the issuer in a suit brought by
the issuer or on behalf of the issuer by one of its shareholders.5
Within the framework of this statutory mandate, the recent case of
115 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1964).
2 See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1964).
3 In recognition of the widespread abuse of the corporate privilege, the SEC re-
emphasized in Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), that "[a] significant pur-
pose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that the use of inside information
for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate office." Id. at 912 n.15.
See also Comment, Securities Regulation: Insider Status in Legal Fiction and Financial
Fact - A Proosed Revision to Section 16(b), 50 CAL. L. REV. 500, 508 (1962).
4 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
5 Section 16(b) provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer ... any profit
realized by him from any purchase or sale, or any sale or purchase, of any
equity security of such issuer... within any period of less than six months
... shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer .... 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1964).
Section 16(b) also provides that a stockholder may institute an action if the corpora-
tion "shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail
diligently to prosecute the same thereafter ...." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). In the
latter regard, it should be noted that such a suit differs from a shareholder's derivative
action. See 2 L. Loss, SECURiTIES REGULATION 1045-46 (1961).
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Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp.6 raises the question of whether a
corporation is subject -to section 16(b) liability as a director when
its 'board chairman sits as a director of another corporation whose
securities the first corporation then purchases and sells within 6
months.
During the fall and winter of 1962, George M. Bunker, chair-
man of Martin Marietta's (Martin) board of directors, twice de-
clined invitations extended by Sperry Rand Corporation (Sperry)
to sit on Sperry's board of directors. Bunker, however, accepted a
third invitation and on April 29, 1963, became a Sperry director.
At such time, Martin owned 700,000 shares of Sperry stock;7 subse-
quently, during the period of Bunker's dual role as chairman of
Martin's board and as a Sperry director, Martin acquired an addi-
tional 101,300 shares of Sperry. On August 1, 1963, Bunker re-
signed from Sperry and approximately 1 month thereafter, Martin
sold all of its Sperry stock. In a stockholder's action instituted on
behalf of Sperry, plaintiff sought to recover profits made by Martin
on 101,300 shares of Sperry stock acquired during Bunker's 3-month
tenure as a Sperry director and sold within 6 months after purchase.
Plaintiff alleged that Martin's financial stake in Sperry, Bunker's
control over Martin's investments, and Bunker's role as a Sperry
director were evidence that Bunker was empowered to act as a dep-
uty for Martin and to represent its interests on Sperry's board.
Plaintiff argued that since this enabled Martin to become privy to
inside information concerning Sperry and thereby actually function
through Bunker as a Sperry director, Martin should be considered
a "director" for the purposes of section 16(b) liability. Defend-
ants contended that because Sperry rather than Martin took the
initiative to secure Bunker's directorship, and because Bunker had
neither reported back to Martin on the affairs of Sperry nor received
instructions from Martin regarding his conduct as a Sperry director,
the evidence failed to establish that Martin had "deputized" Bunker.
However, even assuming that Bunker was Martin's deputy and that
Martin thereby became a Sperry "director" under section 16(b),
Martin argued that SEC Rule 16a-10 8 exempted Bunker from di-
rector's liability and that Martin should be similarly exempt.
6406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), petition for cert. filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3018 (U.S.
May 16, 1969) (No. 125).
7 When Sperry initially invited Bunker to join its board, Martin owned no Sperry
stock. However, when Sperry extended another offer 2 months later, Martin held
400,000 shares of Sperry stock. 406 F.2d at 264.
8 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-10 (1968).
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The district court found as a matter of fact that Martin was
not subject to section 16(b) liability because it had not deputized
Bunker.9 The Second Circuit, however, reversed the lower court,
finding that Martin had deputized Bunker to represent its interests
as a Sperry director and that therefore Martin assumed director's
liability under section 16(b) for its short-swing profits. 10 In deter-
mining whether Martin was exempt from such liability, the court
held that SEC Rule 16a-10 was an invalid exercise of SEC power
because it was in derogation of the statutory mandate of section
16(b)."- Thus, since Bunker himself would not have been exempt
from liability by virtue of SEC regulations, the court held that
Martin likewise was not exempt.
Considering the deputization issue first, the court of appeals
demonstrated ain initial reluctance to expand the scope of section
16(b) to cover persons other than directors.' 2 However, -the court
pointed to the judicial tendency to liberally construe other terms of
the statute as illustrating the -necessity for expanding the literal
reach of section 16(b). Premised upon the need to apply the stat-
ute consistent with the legislative purpose, 3 and relying upon the
9 Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 286 F. Supp. 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
1oIn Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 408-09 (1962), the Supreme Court suggested
that a finding of deputization is solely a question of fact. The court in Martin Mari-
etta therefore limited its review of the lower court's findings to the "unless dearly er-
roneous" standard. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). Under this test, the reviewing court may
not reverse the lower court if it merely draws inferences contrary to the lower court's;
rather, the court must be left with a firm conviction that a mistake was committed be-
low. 406 F.2d at 263. In reversing under this standard, the Second Circuit empha-
sized facts it considered more germane and which were ignored by the district court.
Id. at 264. In view of the discretion left to the appellate court by making the deputi-
zation question turn solely upon its emphasis of particular facts without a full review
of the applicable principle of law, it is not surprising that the deputization concept has
been criticized because it lends itself to "disparate interpretations of the same facts by
different judges." Comment, supra note 3, at 500 n.3.
11 See text accompanying notes 36-37 infra.
12 In evidencing this reluctance, the court stated that "the policy underlying the
enactment of § 16(b) does not permit an expansion of the statute's scope." 406 F.2d
at 262. But, then, somewhat inconsistently, the court stated that the courts have seen
fit to construe section 16(b) consistent with its underlying purpose, "even departing
where necessary from the literal statutory language." Id. Such legal jargon would
only seem to confuse the issue, and the court would have fared better to have forth-
rightly admitted that it is necessary, at times, to go beyond the literal language of
section 16(b) in order to preserve the strength of its edict.
13 The courts have scrupulously sought to close loopholes in section 16(b) by rend-
ering a liberal interpretation to its terms. Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 873 (2d
Cir. 1949) (person performing function of an officer, although not officially one,
held an "officer"); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943) (payment of preexisting debt held "sale"); Blau v. Allen,
163 F. Supp. 702, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (purchaser not a director at time of purchase
held to the same liability as if at all times he was a "director").
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Supreme Court's only decision concerning section 16 (b),"4 as well as
other case law firmly acknowledging the existence of a deputization
theory,'5 the court assumed that the validity of the theory was un-
questionable.' 6
In finding that Martin had deputized Bunker, the court empha-
sized the unique position of control that Bunker exercised over
Martin's investments, including personal approval of all of Martin's
purchases of Sperry stock. In view of Bunker's unique position in
Martin, together with his role as a Sperry director, the court reasoned
that Bunker had access to inside information concerning Sperry and
could use such information for Martin's benefit, irrespective of
whether he disclosed the information to other Martin personnel.
Although the court recognized that the situation was ripe for the
insider abuse that section 16(b) was intended to prevent, it held
14 Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962). In dicta the Supreme Court in Lehman
accepted the validity of the deputization theory reasoning that under certain circum-
stances a partnership, acting through one of its partners, could become a "director" for
the purposes of section 16(b) liability. Id. at 409. The Court, however, held, upon
the findings below, that the parmership had not deputized its partner to act as a di-
rector of another corporation. Id. at 410.
15 The origin of the deputization concept dates back to Rattner v. Lehman, 193
F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952) (concurring opinion), when Judge Learned Hand stated in an
omnibus dictum:
I wish to say nothing as to whether, if a firm deputed a partner to represent
its interests as a director on the board, the other partners would not be liable.
True, they would not even then be formally 'directors"; but I am not pre-
pared to say that they could not be so considered; for some purposes the com-
mon law does treat a firm as a jural person. Id. at 567.
See Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See
also Molybdnum Corp. of America v. International Mining Corp., 32 F.R.D. 415 (S.D.
N.Y. 1963). Although prior cases firmly established the validity of the deputization
concept, Martin Marietta is the first case to impose section 16(b) liability pursuant to
a finding of deputization.
106The deputization rationale, however, can be assailed because it expands section
16(b) beyond its plain meaning. This expansion is arguably wrong because section
16(b) imposes a harsh automatic liability upon anyone falling within its edict. See
note 21 infra. Congress therefore intended that section 16(b) liability be measured
by a purely objective standard of proof. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231,
235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). Extending the prohibition of sec-
tion 16(b) beyond circumstances clearly proscribed on its face interjects into the statute
a subjective element in derogation of the legislative purpose. Cf. Heli-Coil Corp. v.
Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965). However, it has been argued that in order
to effectuate the congressional intent the courts must avoid building further limita-
tions into an already narrow statute. See Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d
Cir. 1959). By rendering a functional definition to the term "director" the courts can
preserve the force of section 16(b)'s command. Yet, a subjective element is not intro-
duced into the objective congressional standard because liability is still automatic once
one falls within section 16(b)'s provisions. The automatic application of section 16(b)
remains unaltered by a threshold inquiry into whether the transaction itself falls sub-
ject to the abuses that section 16(b) was intended to prevent. Cf. Blau v. Lamb, 363
F.2d 507, 519 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Ferraiolo v. New-
man, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958).
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that, without more, Bunker's dual role was not enough to make
him Martin's deputy. Instead, the court pointed to additional evi-
dence to support its deputization finding: First, Bunker's letter
of resignation to Sperry dearly indicated Sperry's belief that Bunker
represented Martin's interests; second, Martin had given formal
authorization to Bunker's acceptance of the Sperry directorship; and
finally, other Martin directors, serving on the boards of corpora-
tions in a manner similar to Bunker, were regularly required to re-
port back to Martin. These facts were taken by the court to be
"definite and concrete indicatives that Bunker, in fact, was a Martin
deputy.' 1 7  Although the inferences drawn from the court's piece-
meal review of these facts support a finding of deputization, un-
fortunately the approach precludes a delineation of the legal ele-
ments underlying the deputization concept."8 Consequently the de-
cision creates the danger that absent further clarification the court's
holding may receive an overly broad application in future cases.
To fully develop a workable application of -the deputization
principle, it is necessary to examine the statutory definition of di-
rector in the perspective of the policy embodied in section 16(b).
The mechanical basis for making a corporation a director is found
in the Exchange Act itself which provides that "person ... means
corporation'1 9 and that director means "any director of a corpora-
tion or any person performing similar functions." 20  Section 16(b)
is premised upon the belief that because all directors have access
to inside information they are likely -to make unfair use of this
data. The statutory objective of curbing insider abuse in trading
17 406 F.2d at 266.
18The court limited its review to whether the lower court's findings were "dearly
erroneous." See note 10 supra. This method of review resulted in approaching the
deputization issue as a question of fact. However, it is arguable that the court un-
necessarily restricted its review and thereby rendered shallow its development of the
legal elements of the deputization concept Perhaps the court should have approached
the issue as a mixed question of law and fact, thus providing a vehicle for further
crystalization of the deputization standard.
The Second Circuit, in particular, has not permitted its standard of review to stand
in the way of fully delineating the legal principles applicable to the facts. Indeed, that
court has recognized that in some instances strict compliance with the standard of re-
view applicable must bend where "there are substantial reasons, particularly relating to
consistency of decision, that dictate rather full review." In re Hygrade Envelope Corp.
v. Gibraltar Factors Corp., 366 F.2d 584, 588 (2d Cir. 1966). Accordingly, in deter-
mining "materiality" for the purposes of liability under Rule 10b-5, the Second Circuit
has treated the issue as a mixed question of law and fact and rendered a full review of
the findings below. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 (2d Cit. 1968)
(en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). There seems to be no basis for treating
the deputization issue differently.
10 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1964).
20 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(7) (1964) (emphasis added).
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therefore necessitates the creation of a conclusive presumption that
a director -has used inside information when he engages in short-
swing trading of the issuer's securities.2 ' However, the narrowly
structured provisions of section 16(b) also indicate that this pre-
sumption should not encompass every situation where the potential
for insider abuse is present.22 Therefore, in applying the statute,
the possibility for insider abuse that may exist in any given rela-
tionship should not be singularly important. For example, in the
instant case, Bunker's control over Martin's investments and Mar-
tin's ownership of a substantial block of Sperry stock created the
possibility that Bunker could abuse -his director's position to benefit
Martin.2 3  Yet, before applying the deputization rationale, the court
noted the importance of evidence of the view taken by Martin toward
Bunker's position with Sperry.24 In the court's opinion, this evi-
dence sufficiently increased the probability of insider abuse to a
point where it became reasonable to render operative the restrictive
21 A showing of unfair use of inside information is not necessary for recovery un-
der section 16(b). Its liability is absolute, and once one falls within its provisions,
liability is imposed irrespective of any motive or intent on the part of the insider.
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943). See Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 515 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1002 (1967); 2 L. Loss, supra note 5, at 1041. This conclusive presumption was deemed
necessary to curb insider abuse because of the difficulties of proving motive or intent.
Hence, Congress devised a "crude rule of thumb" to obviate such evidentiary diffi-
culties. Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15, at 6557 (1934).
22The Supreme Court, in Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962), reasoned that
since Congress had considered and rejected an earlier draft of section 16(b) which would
have subjected to liability any recipient of inside information, Congress tailored the
final draft of section 16(b) to encompass only that specific category of persons men-
tioned in the statute. Id. at 411-12. Such an interpretation of the legislative intent
seems correct - particularly in view of other sections in the Act which place restric-
tions upon disclosure of inside information by insiders. See text accompanying notes
30-32 infra.
2 3 The UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 20 provides: "Partners shall render upon
demand true and full information of all things affecting the partnership in any manner."
By analogy, the funds which Martin Marietta had invested in Sperry Rand might im-
pose a duty upon Bunker to disclose to Martin upon demand information pertinent to
Martin's investments. However, the disclosure duty merely opens the channels of infor-
mation flow, having little relevance to the probability that Bunker would abuse his
position and disclose inside information.
24 The importance of this evidence is that it indicated the extent to which Martin
identified its own interests with those of Bunker's Sperry directorship. Martin's formal
authorization of Bunker's acceptance of the Sperry directorship, coupled with evidence
that other Martin personnel acting as directors on other corporations were required to
report back to Martin, created a strong inference that Martin was likely to have access
to inside information concerning Sperry. Furthermore, Sperry itself believed that
Bunker, in his capacity as a Sperry director, was acting solely in Martin's interest.
See text accompanying note 17 supra.
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provisions of section 16(b) .25 However, given slightly different
circumstances, the court's decision may have been different. Sup-
pose, for example, that Bunker's position of control over Martin's
investments was not as great. Under such facts, the potential for
insider abuse is minimized to the extent that any information would
pass by necessity through a chain of Martin personnel before it
could be used. Thus, in this instance, the court might require a
greater showing of other concrete evidence further demonstrating
that the probability of insider abuse had substantially increased to
where it would be reasonable to conclude that Martin was actually
functioning as a "director." 26
Although the principles drawn from the above analysis do
not evince a precise rule of deputizaton, they do serve to identify
some considerations basic to applying the concept.27  Of primary
significance is the fact that any given set of circumstances requires
going beyond the existence of the alleged deputor-deputy relation-
ship and considering further evidence bearing upon whether mere
25 The court evidently reasoned that since there was a reasonable probability that
Martin possessed inside information and thereby could actually function as a director,
it was necessary to render a functional definition to the term director in order to pre-
serve the force of section 16(b)'s mandate.
It is also interesting to note the relevance of the control concept in establishing
Martin's liability. A well-established principle of corporate law is that a person
exercising controlling influence over a fiduciary assumes for himself the duties owed
by the fiduciary to a third party. Cf. Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d
Cir. 1947). Thus, it can be argued that Martin controlled Bunker and since Bunker
owed a duty to Sperry not to take short-swing profits, Martin itself was subject to the
same duty. Therefore, within the meaning of section 16(b) it can be argued that Mar-
tin assumed the duties of a director by virtue of its control over Bunker. See note 24
supra.
26 Where the deputy's control over the deputor-corporation's investments is limited,
the court might be more inclined to require affirmative conduct on the part of the
deputor-corporation indicating an intent to promote its own interests by utilizing the
deputy as a conduit for inside information flowing from the second corporation. For
example, in Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1960), aifd, 368 U.S. 403 (1962),
where the issue was whether the partnership had deputized its partner to serve as a
director of another corporation, the partner did not exercise the absolute control over
the partnership's investments that Bunker exercised over Martin's. The Blau court
considered it of primary importance that the corporation rather than the partnership
took the initiative by inviting the alleged deputy to join its board and that no other
affirmative conduct by the partnership caused the alleged deputy's selection as direc-
tor. Id. at 788-89.
27The uncertainty generated by the failure to establish a clear standard in other
areas of section 16(b) has been criticized because of the difficulties it creates for the
lawyer in advising his corporate client. See Kramer, An Examination of Section 16(b),
21 Bus. LAwYER 183, 188-89 (1965). Appellee, Martin, employed a similar argu-
ment, alleging in its petition for rehearing en banc that the court's ill-defined appli-
cation of the deputization rationale would cause consternation and chaos within the
business community. See Appellee's Brief for Rehearing at 9.
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access to inside information is sufficient 'to support the conclusion
that insider abuse is likely to result. Further, as the deputy's posi-
tion of control within the deputor-corporation decreases, the greater
the need for additional evidence such as the conduct of the alleged
deputor.28 Finally, where additional evidence establishes a nexus
between the interests of both the deputor and the deputy, the jus-
tification for applying the deputization rationale increases because
the probability of insider abuse -that section 16(b) was intended to
prevent -is more likely. However, where the evidence fails to estab-
lish the requisite identity of interests, mere speculation that insider
abuse will result from the deputy's position of director should not
be sufficient to support a finding of deputization.29  Congress did
not intend the conclusive presumption of unfair use of inside in-
formation -implicit in section 16(b) to act as a panacea for every
conceivable abuse -inherent in insider trading.30 Congress provided
that in some situations an affirmative showing of both the posses-
sion and subsequent use of inside information is required to impose
liability and for this reason the increasingly flexible provisions of
section 10(b) 8 and Rule lob-5 2 provide a remedy. To the ex-
28 See note 26 supra.
29 The Court, in Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962), emphasized that Congress
did not intend that section 16(b) subject a business association "to all the responsibili-
ties and financial burdens of its members in carrying on their other individual business
activities." Id. at 410. Thus, the courts have imposed a further condition to section
16(b) liability - the existence of a peculiar agency relationship distinguished by the
identity of the interests of the deputor and deputy and labeled "deputization."
8 0 See note 22 supra.
31 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
32 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968). Recent decisions, both by the courts and the
SEC, indicate that Rule 10b-5 will be an even more potent threat to insider abuse in the
future. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). Rule
10b-5 differs from the automatic liability imposed by section 16(b) in that the former
requires a showing that inside information was possessed and that it was also used to
engage in a purchase or sale. Further, it has been held that the person using inside
information still escapes lob-5 liability if he does not know that the information is un-
available to the investing public. See Cady, Roberts & Co., supra at 912. Conse-
quently, since the burden of proof may be greater under 10b-5 than under section
16(b), it is quite possible that some insider abuse will go unchecked. However, to the
extent that Texas Gulf Sulphur makes more stringent demands upon insiders by im-
posing a greater burden of care, i.e., negligence may now be enough to give rise to a
10b-5 claim, liability under 10b-5 seems to be moving in the direction of the strict
test employed under section 16(b). Thus, since the remedy under lob-5 is essentially
a creature of the courts, in future cases the courts may choose to apply that test to cir-
cumstances giving rise to potential liability under the deputization theory. Such an
approach has the merit of avoiding the necessity of manipulating the congressionally
established standards under section 16(b) in order to curb insider abuse. In addition,
unlike section 16(b) which requires that the short-swing profits inure to the issuer -
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tent that both section 16(b) and section 10(b) prove inadequa.te,
it is the function of Congress rather than the courts -to expand -their
provisions by enacting new legislation.
Given the court's deputization finding, the second question be-
came whether Martin was exempt from section 16(b) liability by
virtue of SEC rules purportedly exempting Bunker. Section 16(a)
of the Act requires directors to report changes in their ownership
of the issuer's equity securities 10 days after the close of each cal-
endar month.3 SEC Form 4, however, clarifies this obligation by
requiring only persons who were directors during the preceding
calendar month* to file a monthly report.34 Martin maintained that
since Bunker's Sperry directorship ceased during the month of Au-
gust, pursuant to section 16(a) he was not required to report trans-
actions occurring in September. Thus, because SEC Rule 16a-10
exempts from section 16(b) liability any transaction exempted
from filing under section 16(a)," Martin argued that Bunker was
thereby exempt from section 16(b) liability and that it should like-
wise be exempt. Rejecting this argument, the court stated that the
purpose of section 16(b) was to prevent the unfair use of inside
information and that where a director resigns his directorship prior
to a sale the possibility exists that both the purchase and the sale
were actuated by inside information. 6 Reasoning that the SEC's
exemptive power is limited to transactions "not comprehended with-
in the purpose" of section 16(b), 3 the court held that to the extent
that SEC Rule 16a-10 exempted the transaction the rule was invalid.
a party which suffered no injury, the remedy under lOb-5 permits the aggrieved pur-
chaser of the securities to recover damages.
33 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964).
34 Form 4 provides that statements must be filed by: "Every person who at any
time during any calendar month was.. . a director or officer of the company which is
the issuer of such securities, and who during such month had any change in his bene-
ficial ownership of any class of equity securities of such company." SEC Form 4, in
R. KNAUSS, ScutEITIS REGULATION SOURCBBOOK, SEC Forms § 7 (1965).
85 SEC Rule 16a-10 provides: "Any transaction which has or shall be exempted by
the Commission from the requirements of section 16(a) shall in so far as it is other-
wise subject to the provisions of section 16(b), be likewise exempted from section
16(b)." 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-10 (1968).
86 406 F.2d at 268.
37 Secton 16(b) provides: "This subsection shall not be construed to cover any
transaction . ..or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may
exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection." 15 U.S.C. §
78p(b) (1964). The court's basis for thus limiting the SEC's exemptive power is un-
clear because the plain meaning of the statute seems to grant the SEC broad powers to
determine the scope of section 16(b) relative to the congressional purpose. The plain
meaning approach is particularly desirable in view of the complex and technical prob-
lems involved in applying section 16(b). See generally Kramer, supra note 27, at 188.
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In holding -that a former director would be liable under section
16(b) for profits realized on stock purchases while he was a di-
rector and sold within 6 months, the Second Circuit became the first
court to make such a finding. In an earlier case, however, the court
held that a director was subject to section 16(b) liability even
though he had not been a director at the time of purchase.8  From
the standpoint of safeguarding the effectiveness of section 16(b),
the obvious corollary to this rule is that an ex-director is similarly
subject ,to liability, notwithstanding his lack of status as a director
at the time of sale. 9 However, in achieving this latter result, the
court may 'have needlessly declared SEC Rule 16a-10 invalid.
Introductory language in section 16(b) suggests that only such
persons required to file under section 16(a) were intended to be
subject ,to section 16(b) liability.4" However, it can be argued that
such language provides 'that any director required to file a monthly
report pursuant to section 16(a) remains subject to section 16(b)
liability for the statutory period of 6 months, regardless of whether
he was required to report in the month of sale. Pursuant to such
a construction, Rule 16a-10 would exempt from section 16(b) lia-
bility only directors not required to file a monthly report under
section 16(a) within any 6 month period. SEC Form 4 would
clarify a director's monthly filing obligations under section 16(a)
and would have no bearing upon whether he remained subject to
liability for the full statutory period. Thus, since Bunker was re-
38 Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959).
39 Because section 16(b) expressly states that a 10 percent shareholder is liable for
his short-swing profits only if he was such a shareholder both at the time of purchase
and sale, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius can be used to argue that Con-
gress intended a contrary rule to apply to directors and officers. Adler v. Klawans, 267
F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959). However, excluding directors and officers from the pur-
chase-sale requirement applicable to 10 percent shareholders raises an interesting prob-
lem. Suppose one purchases shares before becoming a director. He then becomes a
director, resigns, and as an ex-director sells the shares 1 month after resigning, but less
than 6 months after purchase. Is he liable under section 16(b), even though he was not
a director at the time of purchase or sale? Using the method of statutory construction
suggested by this writer (see text accompanying notes 40-41 infra), he would not be
liable because at no time during his directorship was he required to file a report pur-
suant to section 16 (a), and, therefore, at no time was he subject to liability under
section 16(b). To the extent that such a result rests more upon happenstance than
logic, SEC clarification of the reporting requirements would seem desirable. For a dis-
cussioa of the most recent SEC rules promulgated under section 16(a), see text accom-
panying notes 45-51 infra.
4 0 Section 16(b) begins: "For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of informa-
tion which may have been obtained by such benefidal owner, director, or officer .... "
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964) (emphasis added). Excepting mere redundancy, it fol-
lows that the word such must refer to "such persons" required to file under section 16(a),
and, therefore, it is arguable that section 16(b) has a built-in exemption and SEC Rule
16a-10 merely restates the statutory mandate.
SECTION 16(b)
quired under section 16(a) to report purchases made during his
Sperry directorship, even following his resignation, he remained
subject -to section 16(b) liability for his short-swing profits until
6 months after purchase.
In failing to -rely upon this alternative construction of SEC Rule
16a-10, the court restricted the SEC's exemptive powers to trans-
actions which the court felt were not in any way susceptible to in-
sider speculation.41 It, therefore, can be argued that the court con-
siders itself, rather than the SEC, primarily responsible for compre-
hending what is within the purpose of section 16(b) .42 Strict ad-
herence to such reasoning in future cases presents the threat that
the expertise and experience of the SEC in the highly technical
areas of section 16(b) will be ignored.4 3
On the other hand, suppose the court was aware of the alterna-
tive construction; could it have chosen to ignore such an interpreta-
tion in order to prompt the SEC into exercising its rulemaking
power to further clarify a director's reporting requirements? 44  If
this was in fact the court's purpose, there is little doubt that it was
successful. Within a few months after the decision, the SEC pro-
posed an amendment to a director's filing requirements under sec-
tion 16(a) 45 and on October 20, 1969, the amendment became ef-
fective.46 SEC Rule 16a-1 now provides that upon realizing a
change in his beneficial ownership of the issuer's stock, a director
4 1 See text accompanying note 36 supra.
4 2 In adopting this position, the court noted that the promulgation of rules is not a
matter within the exclusive dominion of the SEC's expertise. See Green v. Dietz,
247 F.2d 689, 692-93 (2d Cir. 1957); Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246,
254-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). However, this attitude toward the Commission results in
the court replacing the SEC as the primary interpreter of section 16(b)'s purpose. Such
an approach disregards the valuable administrative expertise acquired by the SEC in
dealing with this complex area. See Note, The Role of the Securities Exchange Com-
mission Under Section 16(b), 52 VA. L. REV. 668, 686 (1966).
4 3 See note 42 supra. In light of the arbitrary nature of section 16(b) and the
complex problems that its application was likely to engender, the draftsmen recognized
that "unless considerable latitude is allowed for the exercise of administrative discre-
tion, it is impossible to avoid ... unworkable 'straightjacket' regulation." S. REP. No.
792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934). See Green v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689, 697 (2d Cit.
1957) (dissenting opinion).
4 4 There is ample reason to suspect that the court adopted this approach. In refer-
ring to the "arbitrary and unnecessary" loophole created in section 16(b) by the Com-
mission's reporting requirements, the court urged: "[A) less arbitrarily defined report-
ing requirement for ex-directors is but a logical extension of § 16(b) coverage, would
be a coverage in line with the congressional aims, and would afford greater assurance
that the lawmakers' intent will be effectuated." 406 F.2d at 269.
45 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8574, 34 Fed. Reg. 7250 (1969).
46 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8697, 34 Fed. Reg. 15246 (1969),
amending SEC Rule 16a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 2 4 0.16a-1 (1968).
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must include in his first Form 4 report all such changes which oc-
curred within the previous 6 months." The Rule further provides
that any person, upon ceasing to be a director, must report a change
in his beneficial ownership if it occurs less than 6 months after any
such previous change in his ownership.48 The new provisions both
clarify the situation in Maartin Marietta, where a director resigns
before a sale, and cover the case where a purchase is made prior to
directorship.49 To the extent that the provisions succeed in cover-
ing all transactions in which inside information can be used by a
director to make a profit,50 they are consistent with the court's inter-
pretation of the statutory mandate. 51
The congressional purpose in enacting section 16(b) was to
47 Subsection (d) of SEC Rule 16a-1 provides:
Any director or officer who is required to file a statement on Form 4 with
respect to any change in his beneficial ownership of equity securities which
occurs within 6 months after he became a director or officer of the issuer
of such securities, or within 6 months after equity securities of such issuer
first became registered pursuant to section 12 of the Act, shall include in the
first such statement the information called for by Form 4 with respect to all
changes in his beneficial ownership of equity securities of such issuer which
occurred within 6 months prior to the date of the changes which requires the
filing of such statement. SEC Rule 16a-l(d), 34 Fed. Reg. 15246 (1969).
48 Subsection (e) of the Rule provides:
Any person who has ceased to be a director or officer of an issuer which
has equity securities registered pursuant to section 12 of the Act, or who is
a director or officer of an issuer at the time it ceased to have any equity se-
curities so registered, shall file a statement on Form 4 with respect to any
change in his beneficial ownership of equity securities of such issuer which
shall occur on or after the date on which he ceased to be such director or of-
ficer, or the date on which the issuer ceased to have any equity securities so
registered, as the case may be, if such change shall occur within 6 months
after any change in his beneficial ownership of such securities prior to such
date. The statement on Form 4 shall be filed within 10 days after the end
of the month in which the reported change in beneficial ownership occurs.
SEC Rule 16a-l(e), 34 Fed. Reg. 15246 (1969).
49 In reference to the latter situation, see text accompanying note 38 supra.
50 Presumably, the theory of the new provisions is that the policy of section 16(b)
dictates that a director be subject to liability when, anytime during a 6-month period
between purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, such director has access to inside in-
formation by virtue of his status as a director. The amendments, therefore, cover the
situation where a purchase is made prior to directorship, director status is then assumed,
and less than 6 months after purchase, but 1 month after resigning the directorship,
a sale is made. Under even the most liberal construction of the old filing require-
ments, such a transaction was not covered by section 16(b) because at no time was the
director required to file a report pursuant to section 16(a). See note 39 supra. How-
ever, under new Rule 16a-1, the transaction is subject to section 16(b) liability because
a former director must report any change in beneficial ownership occurring less than
6 months after any previous change in ownership. SEC Rule 16a-l(e), 34 Fed. Reg.
15246 (1969). Thus, since a director is required to file pursuant to section 16(a),
he remains subject to section 16(b) liability for 6 months after a previous change in
ownership.
5 1 See text accompanying note 36 supra.
